Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
98. North and South seem to present greater difficulty, by reason of
their fixedness in relation to us; still it is easy to show that this
is not absolute, but only apparent. Let N and S represent the north
and south poles. If we imagine the earth and the heavens to turn at
the same time from south to north, it is evident that the fixedness
of the points N and S would not exist, and yet the observer A would
believe that every thing was immovable, because the appearances would
be absolutely the same.
To an observer travelling from the equator toward either pole, the pole
would rise over the horizon, while to another who remains in the same
place, the pole would be at rest.
Even in relation to the same position on the earth the altitude of the
pole changes, by the variation of the angle formed by the plane of the
ecliptic with the plane of the equator, which variation is according
to some calculations 8″ in a century, according to others 0″.521 in a
year, or 52′.1″ in a century.
99. It follows from these reflections that the position of bodies
is not absolute, but relative; that one body might exist alone, but
then it would have no position, as this is entirely a relative idea,
and there is no relation in this case, because there is no point of
comparison; and that absolutely speaking there is no such thing as
_above_ or _below_; for although we imagine these to be fixed points,
this imagination is only a comparison which we make between two points:
below being that point toward which we gravitate, and above the
opposite. Thus in the antipodes above is what we call below, and below
what we call above.
100. Direction is impossible without points to which it can be
referred. Therefore, without the existence of bodies, directions are
purely ideal, and if only one body existed, it could have no directions
out of its own extension.
101. Here arises a difficulty apparently serious, but in reality of
little weight. If only one body existed, could God give it motion? To
deny it seems to limit the omnipotence of God; and to concede it is to
destroy all that has been said against space distinct from bodies.
This objection derives its seeming importance from a confusion of
ideas, which is caused by not understanding the true state of the
question. Is this motion _intrinsically impossible_, or is it not? If
it is impossible, there is no reason why we should be afraid to say
that God cannot produce it: for omnipotence does not extend to things
which are contradictory. If the possibility of this motion is admitted,
then we must return to the questions on the nature of space, and
examine whether the reasons on which this impossibility is founded are,
or are not, valid.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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