Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
114. In this he confounds, I say, the vague imagination with the idea.
The limit between the two is strongly marked. When we see an object we
have the sensation and intuition of extension. The space perceived or
sensed is, in this case, the extension itself perceived. We imagine a
multitude of extended objects, and a capacity which contains them all.
We imagine this capacity as the immensity of the ethereal regions, a
boundless abyss, a dark region beyond the limits of creation. So far
there is no idea, there is only an imagination arising from the fact
that when we begin to see bodies we do not see the air which surrounds
them, and the transparency of the air permits us to see distant
objects, and thus from our infancy we are accustomed to imagine an
empty capacity in which all bodies are placed, but which is distinct
from them.
But this is not the idea of space; it is only an imagination of it, a
sort of rude, sensible idea, probably common to man and the beasts. The
true idea, and the only one deserving the name, is that which our mind
possesses when it conceives extension in itself, without any mixture of
sensation, and which is, as it were, the seed of the whole science of
geometry.
115. It should be observed that the word representation as applied to
purely intellectual ideas must be taken in a purely metaphorical sense,
unless we eliminate from its meaning all that relates to the sensible
order. We know objects by ideas, but they are not represented to us.
Representation, properly speaking, occurs only in the imagination
which necessarily relates to sensible things. If I demonstrate the
properties of a triangle, it is clear that I must know the triangle,
that I must have an idea of it; but this idea is not the natural
representation which is presented to me like a figure in a painting.
All the world, even irrational animals have this representation, yet we
cannot say that brutes have the idea of a triangle. This representation
has no degrees of perfection, but is equally perfect in all. Any
one who imagines three lines with an area enclosed, possesses the
representation of a triangle with as much perfection as Archimedes; but
the same cannot be said of the idea of a triangle, which is evidently
susceptible of various degrees of perfection.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account