Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
150. We shall find it equally impossible to determine these measures
by the impressions which the motion causes in us. If for example we
propose to measure the degree of velocity, by the agitation which
we feel in our body, we shall find that the measure varies with the
agitation, but this agitation depends on the degree of force exerted,
and still more on the strength of the subject. Thus a little child is
obliged to run till he is almost out of breath, to keep up with his
father who is walking fast.
The impossibility of any fixed measure by means of impressions will
be still more apparent if we compare the motion of a horse with the
motion of a microscopic animal. The distance which a horse would pass
over almost without any sensible motion, would require the microscopic
animal to display its whole activity, and run perhaps a whole day.
The horse would scarce believe he had changed his place, whereas the
poor animalcule would at night be overcome by fatigue like one who has
travelled a long journey. Compare now the motion of the horse with the
motion of those fabulous giants who piled up mountains to scale the
heavens; a single step of one of those giants would be a long distance
for the horse to travel.
151. Art seems to be in accordance with science on this point. In art,
size is nothing, the only thing which is regarded is the proportion
or relation. A skilful miniature represents a person as clearly as a
painting the size of life. The same principle is applied to all the
objects embraced by art, the artistic thought never refers directly to
the size; proportion, the _relative_ is all that is attended to; the
absolute counts for nothing. We see the system of relations transferred
to the order of appearances, inasmuch as they affect the faculties
susceptible of pleasure; reason is thus admirably harmonized with
sentiment, in the same manner as we have found intellect harmonized
with the senses.
CHAPTER XXI.
PURE INTELLIGIBILITY OF THE EXTENDED WORLD.
152. Objects in themselves do not change their nature, by the
variety of appearances which they produce in us. A polygon turning
with rapidity has the appearance of a circle; the stars appear like
small points; and considering the various classes of objects, we
may observe that there is a great variety of appearances depending
on circumstances. The nature of a being does not consist in what it
appears, but in what it is. Suppose there were no sensitive being
in the world, the present order of sensibility would disappear; for
without sensitive beings there would be no representations. What would
the world be in that case? This is a great problem of metaphysics.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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