Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
160. There are, in our opinion, various principles, which, with regard
to the human intellect, may be called equally fundamental, both because
they serve as foundation in the common and scientific orders, and
because they do not rest upon any other, since it is impossible to
assign any one which enjoys this quality as an exclusive privilege.
In seeking the fundamental principle, it is customary in the schools
to observe that they do not endeavor to find a truth from which all
others emanate, but an axiom the destruction of which draws with it
that of all other truths, and the firmness of which sustains them,
at least indirectly, in such manner that whoever denies them may be
refuted by indirect demonstration, or reduction _ad absurdum_; that is,
admitting the above axiom, it may follow that whoever denies the others
will be convicted of being in opposition to one which he himself has
acknowledged to be true.
161. It has been much disputed whether this or that principle merit
the preference. We believe that there is here a confusion of ideas,
proceeding in great part from not sufficiently marking the limits of
testimonies so distinct as those of consciousness, of evidence, and of
common sense.
Descartes' famous principle, _I think, therefore I am_; that of
contradiction, _it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at
the same time_; and what is called the principle of the Cartesians,
_whatever is contained in the clear and distinct idea of anything, may
be affirmed of it with all certainty_; are the three principles that
have divided the schools. In favor of each, reasons the most powerful,
and even conclusive against the others, considering the ground on which
the question was placed, have been brought forward.
If you are not certain that you think, argues the partisan
of Descartes, you cannot be certain even of the principle of
contradiction, or know the criterion of evidence to be valid; for
both, it is necessary to think; whoever affirms or denies anything,
thinks; without thought, neither affirmation nor negation is possible.
But let us admit thought: we have already a foundation, and one of
such a nature that we find it in ourselves, attested by consciousness,
irresistibly forcing upon us the certainty of its existence. The
foundation once laid, we see how the edifice can be raised; for this
we need not go out of our own thought; there is the luminous point to
conduct us in the path to truth; let us follow its splendor, and having
established an immovable point, let us draw from it the mysterious
thread to guide us in the labyrinth of science. Thus our principle is
the first, the basis of all others; it has sufficient power to sustain
itself, sufficient also to impart firmness to others.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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