Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
170. Descartes did not always express himself with, sufficient accuracy
when announcing and explaining his principle; and hence his words have
been misinterpreted. In the passage where he establishes consciousness
of our own thought and existence as the foundation whereon all our
cognitions must rest, he uses terms from which it can be inferred that
he not only means to declare a fact, but that he also intends to afford
a true argument. Nevertheless, if we read his words attentively, and
compare them with one another, it will be evident that such was not
his idea, although we should not sometimes be wrong in saying that he
did not make sufficient account of the difference, which we have just
pointed out, between an argument and the simple declaration of a fact;
and that, when concentrating himself on himself, he did not have a
sufficiently clear _reflex_ knowledge of the manner in which he rested
upon his fundamental principle. To convince ourselves of this, let us
examine his own words: "While we thus reject every thing of which we
can have the least doubt, and even _feign_ that it is false, we easily
suppose that there is no God, no heaven, no earth; that we have not
a body: but we cannot in like manner suppose that we are not whilst
we doubt the truth of all these things; for we experience so great
repugnance to conceive that what thinks is not at the same time that it
thinks, that notwithstanding all the most extravagant suppositions, we
cannot help believing this conclusion, _I think, therefore I am_, to be
true, and consequently the first and most certain to present itself to
him who orders well his thoughts."[10]
[10] Descartes. _Principes de la Philosophie_, 1^{ière} partie, N. 7.
In this passage we detect a true syllogism: whatever thinks, exists;
but I think; therefore I exist. "We have," says Descartes, "so great
repugnance to conceive that what thinks is not at the same time that
it thinks;" which is the same as to say, whatever thinks, exists; and
this, in scholastic terms, is to establish the major. He then says:
"notwithstanding all the most extravagant suppositions, we cannot help
believing this conclusion, _I think, therefore I am_, to be true;"
which is equivalent to proving the minor, and the conclusion of the
syllogism. We know that Descartes was somewhat taken up with the idea
of proving at the same time that he was engaged in declaring. This was
the general tendency of his age, and even the most ardent reformers
with difficulty preserved themselves from the surrounding atmosphere.
We encounter this same spirit throughout his meditations, admirably
joined, however, with the spirit of observation.
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