Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
As he did not express himself with sufficient clearness, so his
adversaries did not press him with all the precision and energy
possible. To settle this whole matter, it would have sufficed to
ask him this question: Do you mean to say that, in commencing our
philosophical investigations, there is a moment in which we _really_
and _actually_ doubt of every thing; or do you deem it sufficient
to abstract certainty, and to suppose that we have it not, as is
frequently done in other studies?
174. Descartes was like all reformers who are ruled by one idea, and
express it so strongly as to seem to admit no other beside it. In
their language every thing is absolute, exclusive. They anticipate the
combat which they must sustain, perhaps already experience it, and so
they concentrate all their strength on the idea whose triumph they
propose, and lose sight of every thing else. It cannot be inferred
from this that they have no others which notably modify the principal;
but to oppose their adversaries, who say, "This is absolutely false,"
they assert that it is absolutely true. History and experience furnish
innumerable examples of such exaggerations.
The dominant idea of Descartes was to demolish the philosophy which at
that time reigned in the schools; and he gave it so rude a shock as
to make the world tremble. See how he expressed his contempt for many
called philosophers: "Experience shows that they who make profession of
being philosophers are often less wise and less reasonable than they
who never applied themselves to this study."[11]
[11] _Les Principes de la Philosophie._ Preface, p. 13.
175. The second part of Descartes' method consists in taking thought
for the point of departure, and in declaring that in trying to doubt of
every thing man finds a limit in the consciousness of his thought, his
existence. This is evidently the phenomenon which remains in the mind
of the observer after doubting of every thing else; at least he cannot
doubt that he doubts, and consequently that he thinks; for it must be
remarked that this is an argument which has always been used against
skeptics, which is equivalent to Descartes' method, and establishes
as an undeniable phenomenon a certainty superior to all sophisms, the
consciousness of one's self.
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