191. This division of judgment, into analytic and synthetic, is much used in modern philosophy, above all among the Germans; certainly there are some who may imagine this to be a discovery made by the author of the _Critic of Pure Reason_; and the very novelty of the name may give occasion to equivocation. Yet, in all the scholastic writers who lie forgotten, and covered with dust, in the recesses of libraries, we find analytic and synthetic judgments, though not under these names. They said there were two kinds of judgments; some, in which the predicate was contained in the idea of subject, and others, in which it was not. They called the propositions which expressed judgments of the former class, _per se notæ_, or known by themselves, because, the meaning of the terms being understood, the predicate was seen to be contained in the idea, or the conception of the subject. They also called them first principles, and the perception of them, _intelligence_, _intellectus_, to distinguish them from _reason_, which is conversant about the cognitions of mediate evidence, or ratiocination. See if the following texts of St. Thomas leave any thing to be desired in clearness or precision: "A proposition is known by itself, _per se notæ_, when the predicate is contained in the subject, as; _man is an animal_; for animal is of the essence of man. If, then, it is known to all, what the subject and the predicate are, that proposition will be known by itself to all, as is seen in the first principles of demonstration, which are certain, common things, not unknown to any one, as being and not-being, the whole, the part, and others similar."[18] [18] _Summa Theologica._ P. 1^a, Q. 2^a, A. 1^o, in corp. "Any proposition the predicate of which is of the essence of the subject, is known by itself, although such a proposition is not known by itself for any one who is ignorant of the definition of the subject. Thus this proposition, _man is rational_, is by its nature known by itself, because _whoever says man, says rational_."[19] [19] 1^a 2^{dae}, Q. 94^a, A. 2^o, in corp. 192. By these, and many other examples, which it would be easy to adduce, it is seen that the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments was common in the schools centuries before Kant flourished. Analytic judgments were all those formed by immediate evidence; and synthetic, those resulting from mediate evidence, whether of the purely ideal order, or in some sense depending on experience. It was well known that there were conceptions of the subject, in which the predicate was thought, at least confusedly; and thus union, or identity, was explained by saying that the propositions, in which it was found, were _per se notæ ex terminis_. In analytic judgments, the predicate is in the subject; nothing is added, according to Kant, it is only unfolded. _Whoever says man says rational_, are the words of St. Thomas: the idea is the same as that of the German philosopher.