Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
68. If the idea of negation be not combined with that of being, it
is perfectly sterile; but thus combined, it has a kind of fecundity
peculiar to itself. The ideas of distinction, of limitation, and of
determination, involve a relative negation, for we do not conceive
distinct beings without conceiving that one is not another; nor
limited beings, without conceiving that they _are wanting_, that is,
that in some sense they _are not_; nor determinate beings, without
conceiving something which makes them what they are and not others.
CHAPTER X.
IDENTITY; DISTINCTION; UNITY; MULTIPLICITY.
69. Let us examine how we may draw from the idea of not-being the
explication of the ideas of identity and distinction, unity and
multiplicity.
Let us conceive a being, and fix our attention solely on it, and
compare it with nothing which is not it, nor permit any idea of
not-being to come in; we shall then, with respect to it, have the
ideas of identity and unity; or, to speak more exactly, these ideas
of identity and unity will be nothing else than ideas of this same
being. Ideas of unity and identity are for this reason inexplicable
by themselves alone; they are simple, or are confounded with a simple
idea in which can be no comparison, and into which if negation enter,
it is not noted, nor can be made the object of reflection. Thus,
for instance, the idea of not-being enters in some manner into the
perception of every limited being; but we can abstract this negation,
and consider what the object _is_, not what it _is not_.
70. If we perceive a being, and afterwards another being, the
perception that one is not the other gives the idea of distinction, and
consequently that also of multiplicity. There is, then, no distinction
or number without perception of relative _not-being_ combined with
_being_; but this perception is all that is requisite to distinction
and number.
71. The ideas of identity and unity are simple, those of distinction
and number composite; the former involve no negation, the latter imply
a negative judgment; "this is not that." It is impossible for A to be
presented to us as distinct from B, if we do not perceive that B is
not A; and on the other hand, we need only to know that B is not A, in
order to enable us to say they are distinct. These expressions, "A is
not B," or, "A and B are distinct," are perfectly identical.
72. From this we infer that the primary combination of our intelligence
consists in the perception of being and not-being. By it we perceive
identity and distinction, unity and number; by it we compare, affirm,
or deny; without it we cannot even think. Without the perception
of negation, we can have only the perception of being, that is, an
intuition fixed upon an identical object, one and immutable, such as we
conceive the Divine Intelligence to be, contemplating the infinity of
being in the infinite essence.
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