80. It is difficult in view of these reasons, which are all strong, to decide without danger of erring for either of the opinions advanced. Nevertheless, we shall give our own in accordance with the principles we have laid down in different parts of this work. We hold that the idea of being is not innate, in the sense that it pre-exists in our understanding as a type anterior to all sensation and to all intellectual acts;[23] but we see no impropriety in calling it innate, if nothing more be meant than the _innate faculty_ of our understanding to perceive objects under the general reason of being or existence, so often as it reflects upon them. Thus the idea does not flow from sensations; it is recognized as a primary element of pure understanding; but it is not formed by abstraction, which separates it from others, and purifies it, so to speak, itself contributing to this purification. In this sense it may exist before reflection, and yet be the fruit of reflection, according to the various stages in which we consider it. Inasmuch as it is mixed and confused with other ideas, it exists before reflection; but inasmuch as it has been separated and purified, it is the fruit of the same reflection. [23] See L. IV., C. XXX. 81. We must, in order to give a complete solution of the difficulties proposed, give our ideas precision and exactness. The idea of being is not only general but also indeterminate; it offers to the mind nothing real or even possible, since we do not conceive that a being, which is only being, does or can exist, if no property besides that of being can be affirmed of it. In God is the plenitude of being; he is his own being; with reason does he call himself, I AM, WHO AM; but we also affirm of him, with all truth, that he is intelligent, that he is free, and that he possesses other perfections not expressed in the pure and general idea of being. From this we infer that we ought not to regard the idea of being as a type representing to us something determinate, even something in general. 82. The act by which we perceive being, existence, reality, is necessary to our understanding, but it is confounded with all other intellectual acts, as a condition _sine qua non_ of them all, until reflection comes to separate it from them, purifying it, and making it the object of our perception. Since, when we perceive, we perceive something, it is evident that the reason of being is always involved in all our perceptions; by the simple fact of knowing we know being, that is, we know _a thing_. But as we do not always, when we fix our perception upon an object, distinguish the various reasons into which it may be decomposed, although the idea of being is contained in every object perceived, it is not directly perceived by our understanding until reflection separates it from all else.