Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
43. Neither the successive nor simultaneous perception of two objects
unaccompanied by relation is the idea of two. Hence the saying: a man
and a horse do not make two, but only one and one; and the reason of
this is that the man and the horse are represented to the understanding
by their difference, not by their resemblance; and things must be
presented to the mind under a common idea in order to give number.
Thus, if we abstract their difference, and consider them only as
animals, or corporeal beings, or beings simply, or things, they will
make two.
44. In objects, then, totally unlike, or not comprehended under some
common idea, there can be no number. Abstract number is number by
excellence; because it eliminates all that distinguishes the things
numbered, and considers them only as beings, consequently as similar,
as contained in the general idea of being. Concrete numbers are
only numbers so far as they participate in this property. _Two_ is
applicable to one horse and another horse, but not to a horse and a
man, unless we identify them under the idea of animal, and abstract
rationality and irrationality. Concrete number requires a common
denomination; otherwise it is not number.
45. The idea of distinction, that is, that the one is not the other,
enters into the idea of two, so that this idea necessarily involves an
affirmation and a negation. The affirmation is of the real, possible,
or imaginary existence of the things counted; the negation is of the
one with respect to the other. Affirmation without distinction or
negation involves identity. The idea of two, as well as that of every
other number, includes the ideas of identity and distinction. The
identity is of each extreme with itself; the distinction is of the
extremes among themselves. Identity in the thing is the thing itself:
identity in the idea is the simple perception of the thing. Distinction
in the thing is the negation of it with respect to others: distinction
in the idea is the perception of negation. We always perceive a thing
as identical, and consequently every perception includes the idea
of unity. But we do not always, when we perceive a thing, observe
its negation with respect to others, and consequently do not always
perceive number. The idea of number originates in comparison, when we
see an object which _is not_ another.
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