Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
Let us suppose that God had created only one being, and this being
had ceased to exist; and let us see what would be the result of
this hypothesis. God knows the existence and the non-existence of
the object. This intellectual act is most simple; there can be no
succession in it. There is properly no past with respect to God,
and applied to the object this idea can only mean its non-existence
in relation to its existence which is destroyed. When the ideas are
presented in this light it is easy to understand that there is no past
in God, but that there is the knowledge of past things.
65. On this hypothesis, how can the time of only one creature be
measured? By its changes. But if it has none? On this imaginary
supposition there would be no time.
This conclusion is absolutely necessary, although it may at first sight
seem strange. We must either abandon our definition of time, or else
admit that there is no time where there is no change.
66. Whatever conclusions we form on questions founded on imaginary
suppositions, this, at least, is certain--that the idea of past is
essentially relative, and that on no supposition can we conceive the
past, if we take from it all relation. The expression _has been_
implies both being and not-being,--the succession which constitutes
time. In this relation the order is such that not-being is perceived
after being, and this is why it is called past.
67. The idea of the future is also relative to the present. The future
is inconceivable without this relation. The future is that which is
to come,--that which is to be with respect to a real or hypothetical
_now_; for we may apply to the future what we said of the past, that it
is changed by changing the point of its reference. The future for us
will be past to those who come after us; that which was future to those
past, is present or past to us.
The point of reference of the future is always a present moment; it
cannot be referred to the past as its ultimate term; for it is in
itself referred equally to the present.
68. Therefore all that we find in the idea of time that is absolute is
the present. The present needs no relation. It not only needs none, but
it admits none. We can neither refer it to the past nor to the future,
because these two times both presuppose the idea of the present,
without which they cannot even be conceived.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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