Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
74. But, it may be said, these numbers, considered in themselves,
abstracted from their relation to feet or inches, are equal or they
are not equal; consequently they are infinite or not infinite. The
objection vanishes as soon as we correct the error which supports it.
When we abstract all relation to determinate divisions, we consider
number in general; on this supposition there are not two cases, but
only one; there cannot then be a relation of greater or less. We have
only the conception of number in general combined with the idea of the
negation of limit in general; therefore the result must be an infinite
number in the abstract.
The difficulty consists in a contradiction which escapes our sight
at first. We abstract particular conditions in order to know if the
numbers are in themselves infinite or not; and at the same time we do
not abstract them, because it is only in reference to them that the
objection has any meaning, since it supposes the division into various
kinds of units. When, therefore, we speak of particular numbers, and
at the same time pretend to consider them in themselves, we fall into
a contradiction, because we take the numbers both with and without
particular conditions at the same time.
75. From all that has been said, we may conclude that the conception
of infinite number, abstracted from the nature and relations of the
things numbered, involves no contradiction, since it contains only the
two ideas of number, as a collection of beings, and of the absolute
negation of limit; but we cannot affirm from this alone, that an
infinite number can be realized. Infinite number cannot become actual
without an infinite collection of beings; and these beings, when
realized, cannot be abstract beings, which contain nothing else but
being; they must have characteristic qualities, and must be subject to
the conditions imposed by these qualities. As we absolutely abstract
these conditions in the general conception, it is not possible to
discover, from the conception alone, the contradiction which they
may imply. Hence, although there is no contradiction contained in
the conception, there may still be in the reality. In the same
manner, certain mechanical theories are perfectly conceivable, but
they cannot be reduced to practice on account of the opposition of
the matter to which they should be applied. Finite beings are the
matter on which indeterminate and metaphysical conceptions are to be
realized; the possibility of the conceptions does not absolutely prove
the possibility of the beings. The reality may draw with it certain
determinations involving a contradiction which was latent in the
general conception, and is made manifest by the reality.
CHAPTER X.
CONCEPTION OF INFINITE EXTENSION.
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