Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
112. If the absolutely infinite being has no negation of being, it
seems that nothing can be denied, but that everything may be affirmed
of it, for it must be all; in this case pantheism results from the
idea of infinity. If a true negative proposition can be established in
relation to the infinite being, there is in it a negation of being, or
of the predicate which is denied in the proposition.
It cannot be said that when negative propositions are applied to God,
only a negation is denied, for in reality positive things are denied of
God. When I say that God is not extended, I deny of him a reality which
is extension. When I say God is not the universe, I deny of him the
reality of the universe. Therefore negative propositions, as applied to
God, deny not only negations, but also realities.
It does not seem to solve the difficulty to say that the realities
denied involve imperfection, and are, consequently, repugnant to God.
This is very true, but we are treating at present of the explanation
of the idea of the absolutely infinite, and the difficulty militates
against the supposition that the idea of the absolutely infinite is to
be explained by the absolute absence of negation of being. If these
realities are any thing, when denied of God some being is denied;
and since the proposition cannot be true if there is not in God the
negation of the being denied, it follows that it is incorrect to say
that the absolutely infinite being is that which has no negation of
being.
113. It also seems that a being of this nature could have no
properties; for some positive properties exclude others: thus,
intelligence and extension, freedom of will and necessity with respect
to the same thing are positive properties which mutually exclude one
another. Therefore the infinite being cannot have all properties,
unless we make it a collection of absurdities, after the fashion of
pantheists.
114. The infinite being must have all being which involves no
imperfection. This is very true, but there still remain serious
difficulties to be solved. What is perfection? What is imperfection?
These are questions which it is not easy to answer, and yet we cannot
advance a step until we have determined their meaning.
115. The idea of perfection implies being: nothing cannot be perfect, a
perfect not-being is a manifest contradiction.
116. Not all being is absolute perfection; for there are modes of
being which involve imperfection: what is perfection for one being is
imperfection for another.
117. In finite beings perfection is relative; a very perfect barn would
be a very imperfect church; a painting may be an ornament in a gallery
which would be a profanation if placed in the sanctuary. Perfection
seems to consist in a property being conducive to its end. This idea is
not applicable to the infinite being which can have no other end than
itself. Therefore, perfection in the absolutely infinite being cannot
be relative, but must be absolute.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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