Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
8. Let us go deeper into the matter. If we only received the successive
impressions without any means of referring them to the same object,
to connect them in a common point, we should find no difference
between the two cases of which we have been speaking. If a piece of
white paper be placed before us, and, after turning our eyes aside
for a moment, we find a blue paper in the same place, with the same
dimensions, and after again turning our eyes aside we find a red paper:
it is clear that it would be impossible for us to distinguish, by the
mere succession of the visual impressions, whether the same paper has
been differently colored in succession, or different papers have been
substituted for the first. But if we keep our eyes on the place where
the paper is, we see whether the paper is colored or changed. In the
first case, the appearance of the new color will continue with the same
sensation of the paper, unmoved, the transformation is made without our
losing sight of it, and the paper receives the continued succession
of its motions and positions under the hand of the one who colors it.
We are then sure that the paper is the same, because there has been
a continuity of sensation, or rather a connection of the different
colors with a third, resulting from the situation of the paper and
its motions, and from all that by which we know what is common to the
first and the second. But if there is no new coloring of the paper, but
a substitution of a differently colored paper, we see that the first
paper is taken away; the whole order of the sensation is interrupted,
and new sensations are presented. These last have no connection with
the first; there is, consequently, for us a different _thing_.
9. This shows how the idea of substance with respect to bodies is
generated in us, or, to speak more properly, how we apply the idea of
substance to bodies. When we discover a link which unites the different
sensations in one point, we call that in which they are united,
substance. And as we meet in nature with many of these points which are
independent of one another, we naturally say there are many corporeal
substances.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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