Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
32. We do not conclude from this that true unity does not exist in
bodies; if we could know their essence, we should doubtless discover
it, whether in the monads, as maintained by Leibnitz, or in something
else more or less resembling them. Although this knowledge of their
essence is denied us, reason leads us to this unity. The composite
is formed of parts; if these parts are in turn formed of others, we
must at last come to something which has no parts; here we find the
indivisible, or rather, the true unity. This reasoning is equally
valid, even though we suppose matter to be infinitely divisible.
Infinite divisibility would suppose an infinity of parts into which
any body may be divided: these parts would therefore exist; these
infinitesimal elements would be real: the unity would be in them.
33. Independently of the external world, we find the idea of substance
in ourselves; consciousness reveals its real application and perfect
unity. Consciousness makes known to us that we think, desire, feel, and
experience an infinity of affections, some of which are subject to our
will and are the product of the internal activity of our soul; others
are independent of us, they come without our will, and often against
it, and it is not always in our power to reproduce them even if we wish
it.
This ebb and flow of ideas, volitions, and sentiments, have a point
in which they are connected, a subject which receives them, remembers
them, combines them, and seeks or avoids them; this being, of which we
are internally conscious, philosophers have called the _me_. It is one
and identical under all transformations; this unity, this identity, is
an indisputable fact which consciousness reveals to us. Who could make
us doubt that the _me_ which thinks at the present moment is not the
same which thought yesterday, which thought years ago? Notwithstanding
the variety of thoughts and desires, the changes of opinion and will,
who could deprive us of the firm and deep conviction which we have
that we are the same who experience them all, that there is something
here within us which is the subject of them all?
34. If there were not something in us permanent in the midst of this
variety, the consciousness of the _me_ would be impossible. Memory and
combination would also be impossible; for there would be within us only
a succession of unconnected phenomena. Thinking is impossible without
something which thinks and remains identical under the variety of the
forms of thought. There is, therefore, within us a simple subject which
connects all the changes which occur in it: there is a substance. In it
there is unity: the unity which we only find in corporeal substances
after an infinite series of decompositions, is presented to us in
the spiritual substance, at the first instant, as a simple internal
fact, without which, all the phenomena which we perceive within us are
absurd, and all experience of the external world impossible.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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