Thus, although he may suffer a little from the foreign garb, and the reader may be fatigued with deciphering enigmas, he will have an idea of the matter and of the form of the system, which he could not have, if we should take from the philosopher his extravagant originality, which, however, relates to the form, rather than to the substance. 130. "This act, namely X = I am, is founded on no higher principle."[52] [52] _Grundlage der gesammten Wissensehaftslehre._ Erst. Th. 1. § 6. b. This is true to a certain extent, inasmuch as it affirms that in the series of the facts of consciousness, we come to our own existence as the last limit, and can go no farther. The reflex act, by which we perceive our existence, is expressed by the proposition, _I am_, or, _I exist_; but this proposition by itself alone, tells us nothing as to the nature of the _me_, and is very far from proving our absolute independence. On the contrary, from the moment that we begin to reflect, internal facts are presented to us which incline us to believe that our being is dependent on another; and in proportion as we continue to reflect, we acquire a deep conviction of this truth, arising from a rigorous demonstration. In no way can we affirm that the act, _I am_, does not depend on any higher principle, if we mean by that, that the act does not spring from any _principle of action_, and that by itself alone, it produces existence. Besides plainly contradicting common sense, this assertion is without any proof, and is also opposed to the most fundamental notions of sound philosophy. 131. Fichte thinks differently, and without knowing why, he deduces from the above propositions these consequences: "Therefore it (the act, X = _I am_) is _supposed absolutely_, and _founded on itself_, as the principle _of a certain_ (and, as will be seen by the whole _Doctrine of Science_, _of every_) act of the human mind, consequently, also of its pure character,--the pure character of activity in itself, abstracted from its particular empirical conditions." It is no great discovery that the character of _act_ is _activity_; but this character is not _pure_, since in us no act is pure activity, but it is always a particular exercise of activity. "Consequently," he continues, "the supposition of the _me_ by itself is its pure activity. The _me supposes itself_, and it _is_, in virtue of this mere supposition by itself; and on the other hand, the _me is_ and it _supposes_ its being, by virtue of its mere being. It is at the same time the acting, and the product of the act; the active, and that which is brought about by the activity; act and fact are one and precisely the same thing; and, therefore, _I am_ is the expression of an act, and also of the only one possible, as must be seen from the whole _Doctrine of Science_."