What does Fichte mean by this comparison of ideas and of language? Does he mean that in this proposition the _me_ is subject and predicate according to the different aspects under which it is considered? Does he mean that the _me_, in so far as it occupies the place of subject, expresses simply existence, and that as predicate it is presented as an object of reflection? What does he mean by the word _suppose_? If he means by it to produce, how is it possible for a thing which is not to produce itself? If he means by it the manifestation of itself, so that the object manifested may serve as the logical term of a proposition, why does he tell us that the _me_ exists because it supposes itself? But let us follow the German philosopher in his wandering deductions. 134. "The _me_ in the first acceptation and that in the second must be absolutely the same. We can therefore invert the above proposition and say: the _me_ supposes itself, absolutely _because_ it is. It _supposes_ itself by its mere being, and _is_ by its mere supposition." Without defining the sense of the word _suppose_, without saying any thing more than what all the world knows; that the _me_ is the _me_; he infers that the _me_ exists because it supposes itself, and supposes itself because it exists: he identifies existence with supposition without even noticing that at least some preliminary remarks were necessary before placing himself in direct opposition with common sense and the doctrines of all philosophers, including Descartes, who make existence necessary for action, and regard it as a contradiction for a thing to be active without existing. Leibnitz thought that there was nothing and could be nothing without a sufficient reason; but thanks to the author of the _Doctrine of Science_, we may henceforth people the world at pleasure with finite or infinite beings, and if asked whence they came, we may answer that they have been supposed; if we are further asked why they have been supposed, we may answer; because they exist; and if still again asked why they exist, we may say, because they have been supposed; thus we may pass from supposition to existence, and from existence to supposition, without any danger of refutation.