That the _me_ did not exist as the object of its reflection before it had consciousness of itself, is an evident truth; before thinking itself, it does not think itself; who ever doubted it? But the difficulty is, whether the _me_ is any thing, independently of its own reflections or its objectiveness in relation to itself; that is, whether there is in the _me_ any thing more than the being thought by itself. The question is not contradictory, but it is one which naturally presents itself to reason and to common sense; for reason as well as common sense resist the taking as identical, that which exists, and that which is known; that which knows itself, and that which produces itself. We are not now examining whether we have or have not a clear idea of the _substratum_ of consciousness; but it is curious to hear the German philosopher remark that when we do not conceive the _me_ as the object of reflection, we conceive it under a bodily form. This is to confound imagination with ideas, things, as I have elsewhere[54] shown, which are very different. [54] See Bk. IV., from Ch. I. to X. 137. It follows from Fichte's doctrine that the existence of the _me_ consists in its supposing itself by means of consciousness; and that if consciousness should not exist, the _me_ would not exist. In this case to be and to be known are the same thing. Although I might ask Fichte for his proofs of so extravagant an assertion, I shall confine myself to insisting on the difficulty which he proposes, and which he only eludes by a confusion of ideas. What would the _me_ be, if it were not conscious of itself? If to exist is to have consciousness, when there is no consciousness there is no existence. Fichte answers that the _me_ without consciousness is not the _me_, in which case, it does not exist; but that the question rests on an impossible supposition, the abstraction of consciousness. "We can think absolutely nothing," he says, "without at the same time thinking the _me_ as conscious of itself; we can never abstract our own consciousness." I say again; these words do not solve the difficulty; they only elude it. I pass over his assertion that consciousness is the same as existence: but it is certain that we conceive an instant in which the _me_ is not conscious of itself. Has this conception never been realized? Has there, or has there not, been an instant in which the _me_ was not conscious of itself? If we admit this instant, we must admit that at this instant the _me_ did not exist; therefore it never could have existed, unless Fichte will concede that the _me_ depends on a superior being, and thus admit the doctrine of creation. If we do not admit this instant, the _me_ has always existed, and with the consciousness of itself; therefore the _me_ is an eternal and immutable intelligence; it is God. There is no way for Fichte to escape this dilemma. There is no room here for the distinction between the _me_ as subject and the