"In so far as the _me_ opposes to itself a _not-me_, it necessarily supposes _limits_, and supposes itself in these limits. It divides the totality of the being supposed in general between the _me_ and the _not-me_; so far supposes itself necessarily as _finite_."[62] [62] Ib., p. 255. 143. Thus Fichte in a few words destroys the reality of the external world, converting it into a modification or development of the activity of the _me_. Is it necessary to stop any longer to refute such an absurd doctrine, one, too, founded on no proof? I believe not: especially since I have established on solid principles the demonstration of the existence of an external world, and have explained the origin and character of the facts of consciousness, without having recourse to such extravagant absurdities.[63] [63] See Bks. II., III., and IV. CHAPTER XIX. RELATIONS OF FICHTE'S SYSTEM TO THE DOCTRINES OF KANT. 144. I have already shown[64] how Kant's system leads to Fichte's. When a dangerous principle is established, there is never wanting an author bold enough to deduce its consequences, whatever they may be. The author of the _Doctrine of Science_, led astray by the doctrines of Kant, establishes the most extravagant pantheism that was ever invented. In concluding his work, he says that he leaves the reader at the point where Kant takes him; he ought rather to have said that he takes the reader at the point where Kant leaves him. The author of the _Critic of Pure Reason_, by converting space into a purely subjective fact, destroys the reality of extension, and opens the door to those who wish to deduce all nature from the _me_; and by making time a simple form of the internal sense, he causes the succession of phenomena in time to be considered as mere modifications of the _me_ to the form of which they relate. [64] See Bk. III., Ch. XVII.