Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
154. Negative judgments form a considerable part of the wealth of
our understanding;[68] pantheism destroys them. In this system the
proposition: A is not B, can never be true; for, if all is identical,
one thing cannot be denied of another, there would be no distinct
things, there would be no _one_ or _another_; all would be one; the
negative judgment must be limited to the following: in reality A is the
same as B, there is only the appearance of distinction; B is A existing
or _presented_ differently.
[68] See Bk. V., Ch. IX.
155. The idea of relation is also absurd in the pantheistic system;
there is no _relation_ without a term of _reference_, and there is no
reference without distinction. According to the pantheists the subject
referred and the term of the reference are absolutely identical; there
are, consequently, no true, but only apparent, relations; thus we find
another of the primary facts of our understanding radically absurd,
because it is in contradiction with the reality, and even with the
possibility.
156. The support of all our knowledge, the principle of contradiction,
it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same
time, is without meaning, and can have no real or possible application,
if the doctrine of pantheism be admitted. When we say that it is
impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time, we
understand that there is the possibility of not-being; in our mind
the idea of being excludes that of not-being only with respect to
the same thing and at the same time. If there is only one being, and
all other being is impossible, it follows that the idea of not-being
is absolutely contradictory, and all the propositions in which it is
expressed are absurd. There is in this case only one being which is
every thing, to this being negation of being can never be applied; this
negation, then, is absolutely absurd, and another idea of our mind is
absolutely contradictory.
157. The idea of contingency is also contradictory if pantheism
be admitted; all that can be is, and all that does not exist is
impossible; therefore when we distinguish contingency from necessity
we contradict both the reality and the possibility. Hence there is
another primary illusion of our mind which presents to us as possible,
and even existent, that which in itself is absurd.
158. Neither can the ideas of finite and infinite co-exist in the
system. One of them must be contradictory; if the only being is
infinite, there is and can be nothing finite; therefore the opposition
between the finite and the infinite is a chimera of our mind, to which
there is nothing in reality corresponding. There is only one thing;
it must be finite or infinite; in either case, one of these terms
must disappear, one of these ideas is contradictory, since it is in
opposition to an absolute necessity.
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