Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
3. Experience teaches this, but it can also be proved by conclusive
arguments. All philosophers agree that the principle of contradiction
is evident of itself to all men, that it needs no application, to
understand the sense of the words sufficing; which could not be true
did not all men have the idea of being. The principle is, that "it is
impossible for a thing _to be_, and _not to be_ at same time." Here,
then, is no question of any thing determinate; neither of body nor
of mind, of substance nor of accidents, of infinite nor of finite,
but of being, of a _thing_, whatever it may be, in its greatest
generality; of which it is affirmed that it cannot both be and not
be at the same time. Had we no idea of being, the principle would
mean nothing: contradiction is inconceivable when we have no idea of
the contradicting extremes, and here the extremes are _being_ and
_not-being_.
4. The same is seen in another principle, closely resembling, if
not identical with, that of contradiction: "every thing either is
or is not." Here, also, there is question of being in its greatest
indeterminateness, considered only as being, as nothing more. Without
the idea of _being_, the axiom could have no meaning.
5. The principle of Descartes, "I think, therefore I am," also includes
the idea of being: "I am." When he undertakes to explain it, this
philosopher relies upon the fact that what is not, cannot act; thus the
idea of being enters not only into the principle of Descartes, but is
even the foundation upon which he rests it.
6. Whether we make the inward sense the basis of our cognitions, or
prefer the evidence by which one idea is contained in another, it is
always necessary to make the idea of being a primary element; we must
suppose the understanding _to be_ before it can think; we must suppose
thought _to be_ before we can make use of it; we must suppose our
sensations and sentiments, the operations and affections of our souls,
_to be_, before we can investigate their causes, their origin, and
inquire into their nature; we must suppose ourselves _to be_, that _we
are_, before we can advance one step in any sense. The idea of being
does then exist in our mind, and is an element indispensable to all
intellectual acts.
CHAPTER II.
SIMPLICITY AND INDETERMINATENESS OF THE IDEA OF BEING.
7. Nothing can be conceived more simple than the idea of being. It
cannot be composed of elements. It allows of nothing determinate, since
it is in itself absolutely indeterminate. The instant that something
determinate is made to enter it, it is in a manner destroyed; it is no
longer the idea of _being_, but of _such a being_; an idea applied,
but not the idea of the being in all its generality.
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