1st. When the animal sensibility is sympathetically raised in a part, this does not always depend on nervous communications; for oftentimes the organ in which is the material cause of pain does not receive any nerves, as the tendons, the cartilages, &c.; then it cannot communicate by them with that in which this pain is found. On the other hand we have seen above that it is still very uncertain if the nerves are the only agent that carry to the brain the internal sensations; we cannot say then that the affected organ acts at first upon the brain by their means, and that this reacts afterwards upon the part in which the pain is seated, by the nerves that go to it. Can we conceive that the cellular texture should be an agent for the communication of pain, which is insensible to it itself? Observe also that the parts that are the most abundantly supplied with this texture, as the scrotum, the mediastinum, &c. are not those that sympathize the most. The same is true of the blood vessels, which, by their nature, are not fitted to transmit animal sensibility, and which besides do not exist in all the organs. It appears that all sympathetic pains are nothing but an aberration of the internal sensitive principle, which refers to a part a sensation, the cause of which exists in another. Thus when the extremity of the stump gives the patient pain, who has just undergone amputation, the sensitive principle perceives the sensation correctly, though it is deceived as to the place whence it comes; it refers it to the foot which no longer exists. It is the same when a stone irritating the bladder, produces pain at the glans penis. Thus all sympathy of animal sensibility is characterized by the integrity of the part in which we find the pain, and by the cessation of this sympathetic pain, when the cause that acts elsewhere has ceased. It is then probable, when a part suffers sympathetically, that that which is the seat of the material cause of the pain acts first upon the brain, either by the nerves, or by some means with which we are unacquainted, and that when the brain perceives the sensation, it is mistaken as to it, and refers it to a part from which it does not arise; or it refers it at the same time to the part from which it arises, and to another where it does not; this happens frequently. The stone for example, produces suffering at the same time in the bladder and at the end of the glans penis.