Major-General Brock had under his immediate command part of the 41st and 49th Regiments, a few companies of militia and three hundred Indians, a force in all of about fifteen hundred men, dispersed between Fort Erie, opposite Black Rock, and Fort George, thirty-six miles distant. Only a {288} small number could be available at any one point. With unwearied diligence the British commander watched the motions of the enemy, but under the circumstances he knew that it was impossible to prevent the landing of the hostile troops, especially if their operations were carried out at night. There was one point in his favour, the want of accord between the American generals. Smyth thought the crossing should be made above the Falls, Van Rensselaer favoured the attack on the river below. A letter to Brock from Sir George Prevost of September 25th, showed that he still held the idea of simply being on the defensive, and had a slavish fear of doing anything that might draw on himself blame from the English ministry. He wrote: "It no longer appears by your letter of the 13th that you consider the enemy's operations on the Niagara frontier indicative of active operations. If the government of America inclines to defensive measures, I can only ascribe its determination to two causes, the first is the expectation of such overtures from us as will lead to a suspension of hostilities preparatory to negotiations for peace; the other arises from having ascertained by experience our ability in the Canadas to resist the attack of a tumultuary force. I agree in opinion with you that so wretched is the organization and discipline of the American army, that at this moment much might be effected against them; but as the government at home could derive no substantial advantage from any disgrace we {289} might inflict on them, whilst the more important concerns of the country are committed in Europe, I again request you will steadily pursue that policy which shall appear to you best calculated to promote the dwindling away of such a force by its own inefficient means." These were certainly rather enigmatical words from the commander-in-chief, and calculated rather to dampen than to inspire the ardour of the defenders of the country. The evil effect of the policy of inaction was soon apparent. [Sidenote: The "Detroit" and "Caledonia"]