It was the responsibility which Gatacre had incurred by advocating an early attack on this fortified position, against the advice of others better acquainted with Soudan warfare, that {202} coloured all his dispositions when the day arrived. He did not, however, let his natural forwardness of character deceive him as to the resistance to be overcome. The author of _The River War_ has already made this point, although he did not know the true interpretation of the situation. "It is impossible not to sympathise with General Gatacre's obvious determination that, whatever happened to the other parts of the assault, the British Brigade should burst into the enclosure at all costs.[1] [1] _The River War_, vol. i. p. 457. This feeling of exaggerated personal responsibility led the General to take up his position at the head of his Brigade. In his letter written four days later he anticipates the criticism that would be levelled against him on this account, and shows that he had weighed the point, and had deliberately forsaken the traditional place. Scientific soldiers may criticise his action, but, according to Mr. Churchill, there was to a civilian a certain grim splendour in the spectacle.[2] [2] _Ibid._, vol. i. p. 468. In the General's last letter before the fight we find the following words: "My men are ready. I have taught them all I know. We shall do our best, and I think my regiments will do all I expect of them; God bless you." [Sidenote: The assault] The battle of the Atbara was fought on Good Friday, April 8, 1898. It was a brilliant victory, and resulted in the capture of Mahmoud and the {203} total defeat of his army. The enemy's losses were estimated at 40 Emirs and 3,000 Dervishes killed. On our side the losses were 24 killed and 101 wounded in the British Brigade, and 56 killed and 371 wounded in the Egyptian Army. It is interesting to note that the casualties in the two Egyptian Brigades, which took part in the assault on the zariba simultaneously with the British regiments, amount to 381, which gives a higher ratio per Brigade than the figure for the British troops, which is 125. So that it is scarcely possible to maintain that the formation adopted in Gatacre's brigade was peculiarly destructive. The General's own letter of April 14 from Darmali furnishes a very graphic account of the engagement and the return march: