Not only, however, did the British Government refuse to adopt either of Gordon's alternative proposals, but they neglected until August 12th to take any other measures for relieving the garrisons. Yet all the time the gallant General felt that he had not a free hand, and could not take independent action, for he writes in his journal:-- "Truly the indecision of our Government has been, from a military point of view, a very great bore, for we never could act as if independent; there was always the chance of their taking action, which hampered us.... It is truly deplorable, the waste of men and money on account of our indecision." The mistake our Government made was the old one of endeavouring to control details in distant countries from Downing Street, instead of sending out the best man to the spot, and giving him more or less of a free hand. At last, on April 16th, Gordon telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring at Cairo:-- "As far as I can understand, the situation is this: You state your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you refuse me Zebehr. I consider myself free to act according to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to the Equator, and leave you the indelible disgrace of abandoning the garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, and Dongola, with the certainty that you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi under great difficulties, if you would retain peace in Egypt!" But though Gordon saw that it was impossible to attempt an immediate evacuation with something like 50,000 men, women, and children, he did everything that lay within his power to get rid of as many refugees as possible during the few weeks that he was in Khartoum before the means of communication were cut off. The measures he took were described by Colonel Duncan, M.P., at that time in command of a station on the Nile, through which the refugees had to pass _en route_ to Egypt, in a speech made some time afterwards, as follows:--