[158] Washington has been censured, by foreign writers, for fighting this battle under such disadvantages. But Congress and the country were clamorous for a battle. Had he surrendered Philadelphia to the English without firing a gun, it would have been the ruin of his reputation. The defeat was certainly less injurious upon the public mind than a continued retreat would have been. [159] In reference to this conflict, Washington wrote to the President of Congress, “But though we fought under many disadvantages, and were, from the causes above mentioned, obliged to retire, our loss of men is not, I am persuaded, very considerable. I believe much less than that of the enemy. We have lost seven or eight pieces of cannon, according to the best information I am able, at present, to obtain. The baggage having been previously moved off, is all secure, saving the men’s blankets, which, being at their backs, many of them are doubtless lost. Divers officers were wounded, and some slain; but the number of either cannot now be ascertained.” [160] Burgoyne wrote: “From the 20th of September to the 7th of October, the armies were so near that not a night passed without firing, and sometimes concerted attacks on our pickets. I do not believe that either officer or soldier ever slept, in that interval, without his clothes; or that any general officer or commander of a regiment passed a single night without being constantly upon his legs, occasionally at different hours, and constantly an hour before day light.”--_Burgoyne’s Expedition_, p. 166. [161] The surrender of Burgoyne, though mainly the result of Washington’s far-seeing plans, had suddenly trumped up Gates into a _quasi_ rival.--_Irving’s Life of Washington_, Vol. II., Mount Vernon edition, p. 429. [162] _Letters to the President of Congress.--Sparks’ Correspondence, Vol. V._, p. 71. [163] In Washington’s account of the battle he wrote: “Had it not been for a thick fog, which rendered it so dark at times, that we were not able to distinguish friend from foe at the distance of thirty yards, we should, I believe, have made a decisive and glorious day of it. Providence designed it otherwise. For after we had driven the enemy a mile or two, after they were in the utmost confusion, and flying before us in most places, after we were upon the point, as it appeared to everybody, of grasping a complete victory, our own troops took fright, and fled with precipitation and disorder.” [164] A British officer wrote: “In this action the Americans, though repulsed, showed themselves a formidable adversary, capable of charging with resolution and retreating in good order. The hope, therefore, of any action with them as decisive, and likely to put a speedy termination to the war, was exceedingly abated.”--_Civil War in America, Vol. I., p. 269._ [165] _Life of Talbot_, by Henry T. Tuckerman, p. 31. [166] _Abbot’s Lives of the Presidents._ Transcriber’s Notes