I sometimes wonder if Houndsditch will open the eyes of the public to the unrealities of Cavalry manoeuvre. How many Cavalry, _condemned to remain in their saddles_, would it take to disable or capture a patrol of determined men using automatic pistols (to say nothing of magazine rifles) either in a "village or lane or at the corner of some wood," or on the rolling downs of Salisbury or Lambourne? FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 5: See "Cavalry Training," p. 194. "It will thus gain freedom to carry out its ultimate rôle of reconnaissance." See also p. 196, where the principle is repeated with emphasis, an exception being made in favour of the case where the enemy's Cavalry is outside the zone of operations!] [Footnote 6: Yet on page 190 he contrasts action _en masse_ in the battle of all Arms with previous action "in detail."] CHAPTER IX THE RIFLE RULES TACTICS ("_Die Feuerwaffe beherrscht die Taktik_") I.--GENERAL VON BERNHARDI ON SOUTH AFRICA. "THE rifle (or literally, the firearm) rules tactics." The phrase was originally my own, but the General has done me the honour of adopting and sanctioning it, and I may fitly bring this criticism of his writings to a conclusion by briefly noting the occasion and origin of this remarkable admission. My book, "War and the _Arme Blanche_," was published in March, 1910, a month before the publication in England of his own second work, "Cavalry in War and Peace," whose consideration we have just concluded. In the course of the summer of 1910 the General published a series of articles in the _Militär Wochenblatt_ criticizing my book, and those articles were translated and printed in the _Cavalry Journal_ of October, 1910. The critic covers limited ground. He makes no rejoinder or allusion of any sort to my own chapter of detailed criticism upon his own earlier work, "Cavalry in Future Wars." He scarcely notices my discussion of the Manchurian War. He confines himself almost wholly to the South African War, and makes it plain (1) that his knowledge of that war is exceedingly deficient; (2) that his principal explanation for the comparative failure of our Regular Cavalry in that war was that they were timidly led; (3) that he had misunderstood the nature of the case which I had endeavoured to construct against the _arme blanche_, and that, so far as he did understand it, he agreed with my conclusions.