Proceedings under the Official Secrets Act were taken by the Director of Public Prosecutions, and in six cases sentences were passed varying from eighteen months to six years' penal servitude. At the same time steps were taken to mark down and keep under observation all the agents known to have been engaged in this traffic, so that when any necessity arose the police might lay hands upon them at once; and accordingly on August 4th, before the declaration of war, instructions were given by the Home Secretary for the arrest of twenty known spies, and all were arrested. This figure, it is added, does not cover over two hundred who were under suspicion or noted to be kept under special observation, the great majority of whom were interned at, or soon after, the declaration of war. Now, although the spy organisation which had been established before the war may have been partially broken up, Mr. McKenna admits that "it is still necessary to take _the most rigorous measures_ to prevent the establishment of any fresh organisation, and to deal with individual spies who might previously have been working in this country outside the organisation, or who might be sent here under the guise of neutrals after the declaration of war." Here really we have the crux of the whole matter. It is easy enough to deal with the known spy; it is easy enough in time of war for the Post Office to watch very closely correspondence not only with Germany, but also with neutral countries, from which letters can so easily be sent into Germany--as I have sent them--and it is easy enough to censor cables. Mr. McKenna says:-- This censorship has been extremely effective in stopping secret communications by cable or letter with the enemy, but as its existence was necessarily known to them, it has not, except in a few instances, produced materials for the detection of espionage. I should think not, indeed! Would any sane person suspect the German Secret Service of such imbecility as endeavouring to send important reports by post or cable from this country in time of war, except as a last desperate resort to deal with some unexpected situation in an apparently harmless message? It was this very thing that brought about the downfall of Lody, and the fact that he attempted to send a cable-message shows how urgent he thought it was that his message should reach its destination as soon as possible. He trusted to luck, but luck failed him. If I thought our Confidential Department regarded such a proceeding as normal, I should indeed be in despair.