"In Berlin I heard people, well-informed people, saying that in every English town of importance, and on every spot of strategical value on the British coast, Germany has got _a few friends_ keeping their eyes open and ready to receive an eventual German raid, and to give their friends as strong a hand as possible." CHAPTER XII HOW TO END THE SPY-PERIL "After this war," said Mr. Justice Ridley, in a passage already quoted, "we must make an end of spies." "After this war," however, may be too late. I contend we should make an end of spies _now_, and with that end in view I would propose very strong measures--so strong that, I willingly admit, only very grave national peril would justify it. That peril, I contend, actually exists to-day, _and no steps we can take to minimise it can be regarded as excessive_. At the present moment it is perfectly easy for any German agent to travel quite freely between England and the Continent. As we know, the Germans have in their possession a large number of stolen British and American passports. By means of these passports their agents can come and go between England and the Continent practically as they please, taking with them any information they can pick up. And, although the collecting of information has been made much more difficult by the additional precautions taken since the outbreak of war, information is still to be obtained by those who know where and how to look for it. Now, the only channels by which this information can be conveyed abroad at present are, first by correspondence in invisible ink beneath an unsuspicious letter addressed to a neutral country--this was proved at the court-martial of the prisoner of war, Otto Luz, at the Douglas Internment Camp--secondly, by travellers between England and the Continent, and thirdly, by secret wireless stations communicating between our shores and the German ships--probably submarines--lying off the coast. All three of these channels of leakage must be stopped. The first step should be the absolute closing of the sea routes from these shores to all persons, excepting those who are vouched for by the British Foreign Office. The second is a much closer and more persistent search for concealed wireless plants, and a third, a closer censorship upon outgoing mails to neutral countries. I happen to know that in certain instances censorship upon both cables and correspondence is quite inadequate.