Germany, Bohemia, and Hungary, Visited in 1837. Vol. IIGleig, G. R. (George Robert)
History
Germany, Bohemia, and Hungary, Visited in 1837. Vol. II
Gleig, G. R. (George Robert)
Austria -- Description and travel; Bohemia (Czech Republic) -- Description and travel; Germany -- Description and travel
jusqu'a Prague, l'ennemi se develope sur en circonference dont j'occupe
le centre; les moindre communications s'allangent pour lui sur les
contours qu'elles devrient suivre; et pour moi quelques marches
suffisent pour me porter partout ou ma presence et mes reserves son
necessaires. Mais il faut que sur les points ou je ne serai pas, mes
lieutenants sechent m'attendre sans rien commettre au hazard." It was
mainly because they neglected to keep this latter injunction in view,
that the reverses which deranged all his magnificent plans occurred.
Napoleon had formed, during the cessation of hostilities, a new
_corps-d'armee_, which he put under the command of General Vandamme,
and brought up from the mouth of the Elbe. It numbered, in all, about
five-and-twenty thousand men, and had instructions to support General
St. Cyr, who with fifteen thousand, was to occupy the fortified
positions near Dresden. Meanwhile, the Duke de Reggio, from his camp at
Dahme, was to march upon Berlin with five-and-thirty thousand men of
all arms; the Prince of Eckmuhl, from Bagedorf, was to co-operate with
him; while General Lemon, the governor of Magdeburg, was to keep open
the communication between them with a corps of six thousand men. These
movements were designed to accomplish a two-fold object. First, they
were to find for the Prussians work enough at home; and to put
Napoleon, if possible, in possession of the Prussian capital. Secondly,
advantage might be taken of the distraction thereby caused in the
counsels of the Allies, while Napoleon, in person, with the Guards,
and the mass of his army, threw himself upon the Austrians. For
Napoleon,--the armistice being virtually at an end,--became impatient
of inactivity, and hoped, while retaining Dresden, and looking to it
throughout as his pivot during the campaign, to find time, ere the
Allies should have perfected their arrangements, to strike a blow both
against Berlin and in Bohemia.
Napoleon had calculated less than he ought to have done on the activity
of Blucher and of the Russians. The former, instead of waiting to be
attacked, took the initiative in Silesia, and drove the French, with
great loss, behind the Bober.
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