Probably the most widely used type of control in this country is private and public control working together, as private ownership and public regulation—for example, railroads, banks, airlines, life insurance companies, telephone systems, and many others. It would be reasonable to expect private ownership and public regulation of a great many classes of robot machines, to the end that they would never threaten the safety of people. Another common type of control is public ownership and operation; examples are toll bridges, airports, city transit systems, and water-supply systems. Atomic energy was so clearly fraught with serious implications that in 1946 the Congress of the United States placed it entirely under public control expressed as the Atomic Energy Commission. There is a class of robot machinery which has already reached the stage of acute public concern: guided missiles and automatic fire-control. It would be reasonable that in this country all activity in this subdivision should be under close control by the Department of Defense. In the international arena, again, the problem becomes soluble if we assume men to be reasonable. An international agency, such as an organ of the United Nations, would take over inspection and control of robot machine activities closely affecting the public safety anywhere in the world. Particularly, this agency would concern itself with guided missiles, robot pilots for planes, automatic gunfire control, etc. Much manufacturing skill is needed to make such products as these: the factories where they could be manufactured would thereby be determined. Also, a giant brain is a useful device for solving scientific problems about weapons of mass destruction. So the agency would need to inspect the problems being solved on such machines. This agency would be responsible to a legislature or an executive body representing all the people in the world—if men were reasonable. In regard to the effects of robot machines on unemployment, again, if men were reasonable, the problem would be soluble. The problem is equivalent to the problem of abundance: how should men distribute the advantages of a vast increase in production among all the members of society in a fair and sensible way? A vast increase in production is not so impossible as it may seem. For example, in 1939, with 45 million employed, the United States index of industrial production was at 109, and, in 1943, with 52½ million employed, the index of production was at 239.