The _formal_ cause of nature is the _ideal reason_; before the
intelligence can produce species or particular things, can bring
them forth from the potentiality of matter into reality, it must
contain them "formally," _i.e._ ideally, in itself, as the sculptor
cannot mould different statues without having first thought out their
different forms.[256] This ideal reason is the _Idea ante rem_ of the
Scholastics. The ideas of the intelligence are not, as such, the things
of nature, they are the models by which the intellect guides nature
in its production of individual things. The _final_ cause which the
intellect sets before itself is the perfection of the universe, _i.e._
that all possible forms may have actual existence in the different
portions of matter; from its joy in this end proceeds its ceaseless
activity in the production of forms out of matter.[257]
[Sidenote: Form.]
Among _constitutive principles_ or elements of things, the
_intellectus_ again takes the foremost place as the form; for, as we
have seen, it is both extrinsic and intrinsic to the nature of things,
... "the soul is in the body as the pilot in the ship; in so far as
he is moved along with it, he is part of the ship, but in so far as
he governs and guides it, he is not a part but a separate agent; so
the soul of the universe, in so far as it animates and gives form to
things, is intrinsic formal principle; in so far as it directs and
governs, it is not part, nor principle, but cause."[258] As external,
the soul of the world is independent of matter, and untouched by its
defects: it is only the perfections of the lower that are present
in the higher being, and that to a higher degree. As internal it
constitutes the soul in all things--down to the very lowest, although
in these it is repressed or latent. This all-presence of soul does not
mean, however, that each particular thing, _e.g._ a table or garment,
is, as such, a living and sensible being, but only that in everything,
however small or insignificant, there is a portion or share of spirit,
animating it, and this, "if it find a properly disposed subject, may
extend itself so as to become plant or animal, and may receive the
limbs of any body whatsoever, such as is commonly said to be animate."
Even the smallest material body, therefore, has in it the potentiality
of life and mind.
[Sidenote: Substance.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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