After two in the morning, quick and definite plans were made for the Saturday-morning session and wholly without consideration of Oyster Bay. What happened at Perkins’ headquarters I do not know. But results came quickly and everybody soon knew that a great harmonious plan, each group compromising for the common interest, had failed, and the cause of its failure was at Oyster Bay. The Central States had the key, and they had the moral courage to sacrifice personal advantage for the larger good. At 2 o’clock they took the bull by the horns and turned sharply to Hughes. Illinois and Indiana were from the beginning the brain and the power of that convention, and it was this powerful group that wished to work with the colonel and who favored you. When forced to follow another leader they showed their wisdom by selecting McCormick, a late Progressive, to announce the move of Illinois toward Hughes--which swung the whole convention into line behind them. The reading of the colonel’s message was unfortunate. It came too late. It was too long. In naming Lodge, it was as disappointing a thing as could be contributed by the colonel’s worst enemy. It was met without applause of any sort. All Roosevelt interest died then and there. Regarding your name at the Convention, it rose head and shoulders above the names of other candidates, and I heard nothing but praise of you, such as would most gratify a sincere man. Some fear of a military man was expressed, but I heard no one among the influential inner group of Republicans who did not always say, “Wood has a record. We can elect him if the colonel will work with us.” Several years later Gutzon learned, from inside sources not to be doubted, several items of information which threw light on the bewildering events of the last night of the convention. In relation to that urgent telegram to the colonel that was never answered, he learned that someone at Progressive headquarters had tapped the line to Oyster Bay; that Gutzon’s message, which had been endorsed by Republican leaders who anxiously awaited the answer, was instantly followed by a message from Progressive headquarters saying that Borglum was all wrong, the author or victim of a “frame-up,” and that the colonel would surely be nominated by acclamation on Saturday morning. It was presented that he, Roosevelt, should withdraw and nominate Senator Lodge, who would refuse by agreement, and the convention would then turn immediately to the colonel. Another item was that Nicholas Murray Butler had likewise talked to Colonel Roosevelt on that fateful Saturday at early dawn and in answer to a query about Leonard Wood’s chances had shaken his head. “Impossible,” he said. “At this juncture in the international situation it would be suicide for us to nominate a military man.” This was told to Gutzon by Herman Hagedorn.