Give the man room : $b The story of Gutzon BorglumCasey, Robert J. (Robert Joseph)
General
Give the man room : $b The story of Gutzon Borglum
Casey, Robert J. (Robert Joseph)
Borglum, Gutzon, 1867-1941
And here is the first amazing part of his procedure. He had seen that
the United States wasn’t producing airplanes and he felt that something
ought to be done about it. But he didn’t look for anybody to help him
prepare the case for presentation to somebody who might be able to
correct the situation. It never occurred to him that he needed any. The
man best able to get quick action was, undoubtedly, the President of the
United States.
Gutzon Borglum knew Woodrow Wilson and Woodrow Wilson knew Gutzon
Borglum, but the pair took a dim view of each other, as well they might.
Borglum, in his Progressive-party campaign, had been loudly critical of
the Wilson administration. Wilson, who was a scholar, appreciated
Borglum’s art. But, as the record shows, he didn’t think enough of his
politics to consider him a crusader for the democratic ideal.
And yet Borglum was appointed, with authority direct from the President,
to conduct his investigation from an office in the War Department. He
ran the boys into corners for several months, and he stirred up senators
and congressmen and Department heads and cabinet officers. That in the
end his inquiry failed to put anybody in jail or get back any of the
§1,000,000,000 is not surprising. What is incredible about the whole
affair is that he was allowed to start at all.
There isn’t much doubt about our dismal performance in building
airplanes in 1917-1918. The propagandized public was a long time finding
out that the chief trouble with our planes was their continued
nonexistence. But we did get to hear about the “dangerous” De Haviland
Fours, of which we sent 213 to France. This plane was widely celebrated
across the country as “The Flaming Coffin.” It had a large gas tank
mounted in the most vulnerable position, and a pilot was seldom able to
get away from one after it was hit.
Soldier after soldier from the front came before the Frear committee to
tell of seeing his comrades shot down in these planes. Yet reports of
such catastrophes, as the Frear report scathingly pointed out, did not
prevent Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and Aircraft Director John D.
Ryan from continuing the manufacture of DH 4s.
After the war the taxpayers began to find out what they had purchased
for §1,000,000,000. Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, ace flyer and national
hero, told them when he came home to testify before an investigating
committee. “Why did the army continue to use French planes?” he was
asked. This was his reply:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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