a new man for this important office, even though there may be a valuable one at the helm, may be put aside for at least some years more. The Assembly sat on the two following days, and was concluded by the presentation of an address to the Maharajah, thanking His Highness for having instituted an elected Assembly, and praying that the various wants brought forward might meet with favourable consideration. In all, the Assembly, inclusive of the preliminary meetings of the representatives, sat for eight days, and though there was much earnestness in discussion, and much difference of opinion, not a single case of an exhibition of ill feeling occurred, with the exception, as we have seen, of the occasion when the marriage question was brought forward, though that may be called an exhibition of warm and excited feeling rather than ill feeling. As the reader will remember, the representatives have no power whatever, except, and a very important exception it of course is, of ventilating in public, and in the presence of the Dewan and the leading officers of State, whatever grievances and wants they may desire to call attention to, and the machinery for this ventilation is now so complete that the requirements even of those inhabiting the most inaccessible corners of the province can be readily made known to the Government. And now this question naturally arises. When, if ever, is it probable that this Assembly will demand for itself some direct power of controlling, or directing the Government? As far as I could see at the time, or can see now, the Assembly is never likely to ask for any power whatever, and I confess that I was much struck with the fact that, though I had many private conversations relating to the Assembly, both with natives and Europeans, I never expressed myself, nor did I ever hear anyone express, a desire that the Assembly should have any power. But after a little reflection, the explanation of the absence of any such demand seems to be extremely obvious, for if we look into the history of all parliamentary institutions such as we have, we shall find that they have arisen primarily from misgovernment, and I say primarily because such institutions in the United States and in our colonies are merely inheritances from the forefathers of the English founders of these countries. The insuperable difficulty, then, in the way of those who desire to create parliamentary institutions in India is, that there is no misgovernment on which to start them, and that is why the Indian National (so called, for there is nothing really national about it) Congress have found it advisable, as a preliminary step, to try and persuade the people, with the aid of lying and seditious pamphlets, that they are misgoverned. If indeed I were the absolute monarch of Mysore I could certainly, I feel sure, create Parliamentary Institutions, but only in one way that I can think of. I should misgovern the country and worry and oppress the people,