Government in Republican ChinaLinebarger, Paul Myron Anthony
History
Government in Republican China
Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony
China -- Politics and government -- 1912-1949
The economic program accorded with considerations partly Hamiltonian,
partly state-socialist. The economy had first of all to be organized and
integrated in national terms, and later to be revised so as to ensure
social justice. The Nationalists were convinced that a policy of
immediate land reform would lead to internal disharmony and frustrate
the very purposes for which the revolution of 1926-1927 had been
launched. The Communists, on the other hand, succeeded in keeping the
agrarian issue from being forgotten and forced the Nationalists to
better the lot of the peasant. In the meantime, China's boom in physical
development and the unification of the commercial, financial,
productive, and legal systems began to startle observers.
As a result, China was able to build national armies in direct ratio
with the invigoration of her national economic system. The war machine
of the National Government, under the care and leadership of
Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek, became the most powerful in China. The
central government's military power in turn speeded up the pace of
general unification. There was thus a remarkable interaction of forces
tending toward national integration. From 1932 to 1937, between the
first and second major phases of the Japanese invasion, progress was
rapid--stimulated, perhaps, by the external menace.
The two greatest dangers to the Nationalist policy of military and
economic unification were (1) the dismal condition of the Chinese
proletariat, as yet small but constantly growing, and (2) the vested
interests of the industrial powers. Had China's growth been less rapid,
the foreigners might have withdrawn slowly and found compensation in
Chinese commerce for their losses in direct ownership in China. There
was one power, however, to which Chinese unification was a living and
increasing threat. The rising military-economic power of the Chinese was
incompatible with the position which Japanese leaders visualized as part
of the manifest destiny of their country. The Japanese might have
tolerated the _tuchün_ system for decades had the _tuchüns_ been able to
establish orderly regional governments; or they might have aided a
reactionary Chinese regime which asked for survival only. The appearance
of a genuine republic in the Far East was a menace to Japan; if that
republic was bound by sheer physical proportions to overshadow Japan,
the unification and modernization of China had to be averted at all
costs.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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