_State Insolvency Laws._--Before the adoption of the Constitution the states passed insolvency laws discharging debtors from their legal obligations, and it has been held by the Supreme Court that they may still pass such laws, subject to the condition that they can affect only citizens of the state in which the law is passed, and apply only to such contracts as may be entered into subsequent to the enactment of the law. If there is a federal bankruptcy law in force it supersedes all conflicting provisions in the state laws on the subject. _Federal Acts._--Since the Constitution went into effect Congress has enacted four different bankruptcy laws, namely, in 1802, 1840, 1867, and 1898, the first three of which were in operation only fifteen years altogether. The present law--that of 1898--provides for both "voluntary" and "involuntary" bankruptcy. Any debtor, except a corporation, may voluntarily have himself adjudged a bankrupt by filing a petition in a United States district court, showing that his liabilities are in excess of his assets. Any debtor except a corporation, a wage earner, or a farmer, may, against his will, upon petition of his creditors, be declared a bankrupt under certain conditions. Bankruptcy petitions are referred to "referees" for examination and report. After hearing the testimony on the petition the referee reports his findings to the court, which makes its decision largely on the basis of such findings. =Implied Powers.=--After expressly enumerating in succession the various powers of Congress, the more important of which have been described above, the Constitution concludes with a sort of general grant, empowering Congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution those enumerated above. This is sometimes called "the elastic clause," since it is capable of being stretched by interpretation to cover many matters that Congress might not otherwise feel authorized to deal with. It is doubtful, however, whether it really adds anything to the power of Congress, since that body would unquestionably have authority to do whatever is necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers expressly conferred upon it. It is a maxim of constitutional construction that wherever power to do a particular thing is conferred, the means for doing it are implied. Manifestly it would have been impossible to set forth in detail all the incidental powers necessary to be exercised in carrying into effect the mandates of the Constitution relating to taxes, coinage, post offices, making war, etc.