_Terms of Office._--The terms of the judges vary widely among the different states. In the early days of our history, the judges generally held their offices during good behavior or until the attainment of a certain age, usually sixty or seventy years. With the growth of democracy, however, most of the states came to adopt short terms for judicial as well as for other public officials. Only in Massachusetts and Rhode Island do the judges of the highest court now serve practically for life. In New Hampshire they serve until they are 70 years of age. Elsewhere the tenure varies from two years, in Vermont, to twenty-one years, in Pennsylvania. In Maryland, the tenure is fifteen years; in New York, fourteen; in several, it is twelve, in some nine, in many six. The advantage of a long term is that it enables the judges to acquire experience and renders them less affected by political influence and popular clamor. _Methods of Choosing the Judges._--In early times the judges were chosen either by the legislature or by the governor. Choice by the legislature was objectionable because it often resulted in selection by political caucuses and in a parceling of the judgeships among the different counties or sections of the state. Appointment by the governor was objectionable to many because it often resulted in the choice of political favorites. Most of the states, therefore, abandoned these methods of choice for popular election, Mississippi in 1832 being the first state to adopt this method. Only in Delaware, Connecticut, New Jersey, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine, are the higher judges now appointed by the governor,--subject to the confirmation of the state senate or the legislature,--and only in Rhode Island, Vermont, South Carolina, and Virginia are they elected by the legislature. In all the other states they are elected by the people. The arguments in favor of popular election are that it is more in harmony with the principles of popular government, and, it is claimed by some, tends to secure a higher class of judges, thus doing away with the evils of executive appointment and of legislative choice described above. The objection to this method, however, is that it compels judicial candidates to engage in political contests, and by making their tenures dependent upon popular favor subjects them to the temptation of shaping their decisions to meet the approval of the people, who, obviously, are not always qualified to judge of the soundness of judicial decisions involving intricate questions of law. Such a method, it is claimed by some, tends to secure the election of able politicians rather than of able judges.