β) What we have said is sufficient to disprove the groundless assertion that the Catholic doctrine concerning the meritoriousness of good works derogates from the merits of Christ and fosters “self-righteousness.” Would it not be far more derogatory to the honor of our Saviour to assume that He failed to obtain for those for whom He suffered and died, a limited capacity for gaining merits? Does it in any way impair the dignity of God as the _causa prima_ to assume that He communicates to His creatures a limited causality, by which they are enabled to act as true _causae secundae_, instead of being mere _causae occasionales_, as the Occasionalists assert?(1259) As regards the other charge, no true Catholic is guilty of “self-righteousness” because he regards his good works as “fruits of justification,” owing purely to grace. The “self-righteousness” of which Luther speaks is incompatible with the virtue of humility. The faithful Christian, according to St. Paul, may safely rejoice over his merits, because the uncertainty of justification and the consciousness that his good works are but limited at best, are a sufficient protection against self-righteousness and presumption.(1260) 3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.—Though the Tridentine Council merely defined in general terms that all good works performed in the state of sanctifying grace are meritorious,(1261) it is theologically certain that the merit due to good works is the merit of condignity. a) According to Pallavicini(1262) the Fathers of Trent without exception were convinced that the merit inherent in good works is a _meritum de condigno_, based upon divine justice, and they purposely employed the term _vere_ to exclude that quasi-merit which in the technical terminology of the Schools is called _meritum de congruo_.(1263) They refrained from expressly employing the term _meritum de condigno_, because _meritum verum_ is a plain and adequate term, and for this additional reason that they wished to avoid certain theological controversies regarding the nature of the _meritum de condigno_ and its requisites.(1264)