Though the good works of the just derive a special intrinsic value from the godlike dignity of adoptive sonship, and, consequently, _in actu primo_, are truly meritorious prior to and apart from their acceptance by God, yet human service and divine remuneration are separated by such a wide gulf that, in order to make a good deed meritorious _in actu secundo_, the divine acceptance and promise of reward must be expressly superadded. In regard to the relation between service and reward Catholic theologians are divided into three schools. The Scotists(1310) hold that the _condignitas_ of a good work rests entirely on God’s gratuitous promise and free acceptance, without which even the most heroic act would be utterly devoid of merit, whereas with it even naturally good works may become meritorious. This rather shallow theory almost completely loses sight of the godlike dignity peculiar to the just in their capacity of “adopted children of God” and “temples of the Holy Ghost,” and is unable to account for such important Biblical terms as “crown of justice,” “prize of victory,” “just judge,” etc. Suarez and his school contend that there is such a perfectly balanced equality between merit and reward that God is obliged in strict justice (_ex obligatione iustitiae_), prior to and apart from any formal act of acceptance or promise on His part, to reward good works by the beatific vision. This view is scarcely tenable because there is no common basis on which to construe a relation of strict justice between the Creator and His creatures,(1311) and moreover St. Paul expressly teaches that “The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come.”(1312)