b) In connection with the dogma just explained theologians discuss the question whether a just man may strictly (_de condigno_) merit the actual graces which God bestows on him. We must carefully distinguish between merely sufficient and efficacious graces. Theologians commonly hold(1328) that merely sufficient graces may be merited _de condigno_, not so efficacious graces, because the right to efficacious graces would necessarily include a strict right to final perseverance (_donum perseverantiae_), which lies outside the sphere of condign merit. Assuming that the justified could by good works strictly merit the _prima gratia efficax_ (an impossible hypothesis, because merit presupposes efficacious grace), this would involve a similar claim to a second, third, fourth grace—and ultimately to the final grace of perseverance, which, in matter of fact, no man can merit. Not even heroic acts of virtue give a strict right to infallibly efficacious graces, or to final perseverance. Even the greatest saint is obliged to watch, pray, and tremble, lest he lapse from righteousness.(1329) For this reason the Tridentine Council mentions neither final perseverance nor efficacious graces among the objects of merit.(1330) 2. ETERNAL LIFE OR HEAVENLY GLORY.—The second object of merit is eternal life. The dogmatic proof for this assertion has been given above.(1331) Eternal life is described by the Tridentine Council(1332) both as a grace and as a reward. a) In the canon quoted in the introduction of this Section the same Council(1333) enumerates four apparently separate and distinct objects of merit, _viz._: increase of grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal life, and increase of glory. Why the distinction between “eternal life” and the “attainment of eternal life”? Does this imply a twofold reward, and consequently a twofold object of merit? Theologians deny that such was the intention of the Council, because the right to a reward evidently coincides with the right to the payment of the same. An unattainable eternal life would be a chimera.(1334) Nevertheless, the distinction is not superfluous, since the attainment of eternal life does not coincide with the gaining of merit but must be put off until death, and even then depends upon the condition of the soul: “_si tamen in gratia decesserit_” (provided he depart in grace). With this last condition the holy Synod also wished to inculcate the salutary truth that the loss of sanctifying grace _ipso facto_ entails the forfeiture of all previously acquired merits. Even the greatest saint, were he to die in the state of mortal sin, would enter eternity with empty hands and as an enemy of God. All his former merits would be cancelled. To revive them would require a new justification.(1335)