a) If there were something in the natural make-up of man which would move the Almighty to give him grace, the bestowal of grace would no longer be a free act of God. But to assert the consequent would be Semipelagian, hence the antecedent must be false. b) This truth can easily be deduced from the teaching of the Fathers in the Semipelagian controversy. They declare, in perfect conformity with St. Paul, that grace is bestowed gratuitously because God can give or withhold it as He pleases. St. Augustine says(451) that the grace of Baptism is granted freely, that is, without regard to any positive disposition on the part of the baptized infant. It should be remembered, moreover, that nature never existed in its pure form, and is now tainted by original sin.(452) Surely a nature tainted by sin cannot possibly possess the power of meriting divine grace. c) The contention of the so-called Augustinians, that pure nature needs actual grace to save itself, and consequently has a claim to such grace at least _ex decentia Creatoris_ and _ex lege iustissimae providentiae_, perilously resembles Baius’ condemned proposition that the state of pure nature is impossible.(453) *Thesis V: Man may prepare himself negatively for the reception of supernatural grace by not putting any obstacles in its way.* This proposition is held by a majority of Catholic theologians (_sententia communior_). Proof. The solution of this question is intimately connected with the famous Scholastic axiom: “_Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam_,” that is, to the man who does what he can, God does not refuse grace. This axiom is susceptible of three different interpretations. a) It may mean: _Facienti quod est in se cum auxilio gratiae Deus confert ulteriorem gratiam_, _i.e._, to him who does what he can with the help of supernatural grace, God grants further and more powerful graces up to justification. This is merely another way of stating the indisputable truth that, by faithfully coöperating with the grace of God, man is able to merit additional graces, and it holds true even of infidels and sinners. The first freely performed salutary act establishes a _meritum de congruo_ towards other acts disposing a man for justification. And since the first as well as all subsequent salutary acts, in this hypothesis, are pure graces, this interpretation of our axiom is entirely compatible with the dogma of the gratuity of grace.(454)