While these and other troubles were in a degree disturbing the calmness of Washington, other considerations did not serve to allay his anxiety. "He knew that congress anxiously contemplated more decisive steps, and that the country looked for events of greater magnitude. The public was ignorant of his actual situation, and conceived his means, for offensive operations, to be much greater than they were; and they expected from him the capture or expulsion of the British army, in Boston. He felt the importance of securing the confidence of his countrymen, by some brilliant action, and was fully sensible that his own reputation was liable to suffer, if he confined himself solely to measures of defence." To publish to his anxious country the state of his army, would be to acquaint the enemy with his weakness, and to hazard his destruction. The firmness and patriotism of General Washington were displayed, in making the good of his country an object of higher consideration, than the applause of those who were incapable of forming a correct opinion of the propriety of his measures. On this, and on many other occasions during the war, he withstood the voice of the populace, rejected the entreaties of the sanguine, and refused to adopt the plans of the rash, that he might ultimately secure the great object of contention. While he resolutely rejected every measure which, in his calm and deliberate judgment he did not approve, he daily pondered the practicability of a successful attack upon Boston. As a preparatory step, he took possession of Plowed hill, Cobble hill, and Lechmere's point, and erected fortifications upon them. These posts brought him within half a mile of the enemy's works on Bunker's hill, and, by his artillery, he drove the British floating-batteries from their stations in Charles' river. He erected floating-batteries to watch the movements of his enemy, and to aid in any offensive operations that circumstances might warrant. In these circumstances, he took the opinion of his general officers, respecting an attack upon Boston; but they unanimously gave their opinion in opposition to the measure, and this opinion was immediately communicated to congress. Congress appeared, however, to favor the attempt; and, that an apprehension of danger to the town of Boston might not have an undue influence upon the operations of the army, resolved, 'That if General Washington and his council of war should be of opinion that a successful attack might be made on the troops in Boston, he should make it in any manner he might think it expedient, notwithstanding the town and the property therein might thereby be destroyed.'[34]