To Washington and his officers, the great defect in the American army was apparent. It was twofold--first, the employment of by far too large a proportion of militia, and secondly, the utter impracticability of introducing among them that discipline and subordination which could place them on equal footing with the practised and veteran troops of the enemy. At length, convinced of the justness of the views of Washington on these points, congress decided that a regular army should be formed, in which the soldiers should be enlisted to serve during the present war; and that it should consist of eighty-eight battalions, to be raised in all the provinces, according to their respective abilities. A bounty of twenty dollars, and a grant of land, were offered. At a subsequent date, soldiers were allowed to enlist for three years; in which case, however, they were not entitled to the grant of land. Had congress, at an earlier day, taken this measure to furnish an adequate army for Washington, both he and the country might have been saved great anxiety, and a succession of mortifying defeats. And but for the adoption of the above resolution, it is scarcely possible to predict what would have been the ultimate fate of the new republic. Fortunate would it have been for the Americans, had their ill-fortune terminated in the defeat experienced on Long Island. To other and not much less mortifying reverses they were destined, ere the deepest point of depression should be reached. It was the ardent wish of Washington to retain possession of New York; but, finding, as he said, in a communication to congress, the militia "dismayed and intractable," and "leaving the camp in some instances almost by regiments, by half-ones, and by companies at a time;" he was compelled to relinquish the place to his enemies, and to abandon, which he still more regretted, all the heavy artillery, and a large portion of the baggage, provisions, and military stores. On leaving the city, the American army took post on Harlem heights. Here Washington had time to ponder upon his situation, and form his plan. His army had become seriously reduced, and from the despondency and dismay which were visible among them, it might become at anytime still more reduced. On the other hand, the forces of the enemy were numerous, and withal consisted of regular and well-disciplined troops. It was futile, therefore, to attempt to maintain offensive operations against them. Far better in his judgment to risk no general engagement; but by retiring gradually before them, to lead them as far as possible from their resources; and in the mean while to inspire his own troops with courage, by engaging them in skirmishes, where success was probable. Having adopted this cautious system, he prepared to put it in practice.