"The battles of Trenton and Princeton, though similar in their outlines, were very different in point of conception and execution. The attack upon Trenton was a blow struck against an enemy in position, which admitted, therefore, of every advantage of preparation on the part of the assailants. The battle of Princeton belonged to a higher and more elaborate order of tactics. The American forces were already engaged with a superior army, commanded by an officer of eminent reputation; and the change of plan was wholly contrived and executed with the enemy in front. It was entirely due to the prompt genius, and fertile resources of Washington, that his army was extricated from so perilous an exposure, and enabled to attack the enemy's rear with such advantage, as to leave it no choice but surrender or flight. A military critic, contemplating these inspirations with a soldier's eye, can easily appreciate the feelings of the great Frederick, when he sent a sword to the American commander, 'as a gift from the world's oldest general to its _best_.'" As a natural result of these unexpected manœuvres, the British officers were thrown into a state of uncertainty, which gave to their subsequent operations an unusual character of timidity. The distant roll of the American artillery at Princeton, first announced to Lord Cornwallis the danger of his rear, and the escape of his active adversary. Alarmed for the safety of his magazines, the British commander instantly broke up from the Assumpinck, and commenced a forced march upon New Brunswick; moving with such celerity as nearly to overtake the American rear at Princeton. On the other hand, Sir William Howe drew in all his forces, by concentration in the neighborhood of Amboy and Brunswick, and abandoned all hope of preventing the recruiting service by overawing the whole extent of the country. Washington, finding the surprise of the stores impossible, moved northward into the highlands of Jersey, in order to afford some relief to the fatigues of his troops; for long and severe exposure to the inclemencies of the winter, without the usual protections, had produced sickness, and even complaint. It was finally considered necessary to abandon offensive operations, and to put the army under cover at Morristown. Among other prudent precautions adopted, during this temporary respite, the commander-in-chief caused the whole army to be innoculated; an operation then very uncommon in America, but which enabled him thereafter to defy a disease, which had proved more fatal than the sword of the enemy.