In other words, the Salonica sedition, though not solely revolutionary, involved a revolution within certain limits. M. Venizelos was far too astute to countenance the republican chimeras cherished by some of his followers. Republicanism, he knew well, found no favour in Greece and could expect no support from England. Therefore, with the monarchical principle he had no quarrel: his hostility was directed wholly against the person of the reigning monarch. A prince pliant to his hand would suit M. Venizelos. If he got the best of it, his avowed intention was to treat King Constantine precisely as he had treated King Constantine's brother in days gone by. We now understand Prince George's earnestness in urging his brother, as long ago as May, 1915, to run before {138} the gale: he spoke from bitter experience of the Protecting Powers and their protege. It is seldom that history repeats itself so accurately; and it is more seldom still that the historian has the means of tracing so surely a rebel's progress. In most cases it is hard to decide whether the hero was guided by events which he could not have foreseen, or whether he had from the first a clear and definite goal in view. In the case of M. Venizelos this difficulty does not exist. Each of his actions, as illuminated by his past, was a step to an end; and he has himself defined that end. [1] _The Times_, 18 Sept., 1916. [2] Carapanos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, 3/16 Sept., 1916. [3] _The Times, loc. cit._ [4] Exchange Tel., Athens, 17 Sept., 1916. Cp. Romanos, Paris, 5/18 Sept. [5] See leading articles in _The Times_, 19 Sept., and the _Morning Post_, 20 Sept., 1916. [6] Carapanos to Greek Legations, Paris and London, 6/19 Sept., 1916. [7] Panas, Petrograd, 14/27 Sept., 1916. [8] Romanos, Paris, 10/23 Sept. Cp. Reuter statement, London, 26 Sept., 1916. This view is crystallized in a personal dispatch from the Greek Minister at Paris to the Director of Political Affairs, at Athens: "_L'appel au pouvoir par S.M. le Roi de M. Venizelos parait au Gouvernement francais le seul moyen de dissiper la mefiance que l'attitude des conseillers de S.M. le Roi ont fait naitre dans l'esprit des cercles dirigeants a Paris et a Londres. . . . L'opinion publique en France n' approuveraii une alliance avec la Grece et les avantages qui en decouleraient pour nous, que si l'homme politique qui incarne l'idee de la solidarite des interets francais et grecs etait appele au pouvoir._"--Romanos to Politis, Paris, 29 Sept./12 Oct., 1916.