Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922Abbott, G. F. (George Frederick)
History
Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922
Abbott, G. F. (George Frederick)
Greece -- Foreign relations; Greece -- Politics and government -- 1913-1917; World War, 1914-1918 -- Greece
There is always a limit beyond which human intelligence cannot be
insulted with success, or human patience tried with impunity. France had
long since overstepped that limit. Across all the self-contradictory
subtleties of her statesmen, the Greeks, thanks to the self-revealing
acts of her soldiers, sailors, and agents, had discerned the real object
of her diplomacy: to force upon them M. Venizelos and to rule them
through him: she had already helped M. Venizelos to establish his sway
over New Greece, and was now attempting to extend it over Old Greece.
The creation of a "neutral zone" did not blind them: they had only too
much reason to know what neutrality meant in the vocabulary of the
Allies: they had taken the King's ships: all that remained was to take
his arms and to hand them over to their protege. Such was the true
significance of the fresh "pledges of friendship" claimed from them; and
the claim aroused unanimous indignation: we will not submit to any
further robbery, they cried. What have we gained by submission so far?
Our conciliatory attitude towards the Allies and our efforts for a
friendly settlement of the questions daily raised by them are regarded as
signs of fear and rewarded accordingly: their arrogance increases with
our compliance. No more compliance. The indignation was, naturally,
most pronounced in military circles, and the officers of the Athens
garrison took a vow to lay down their lives in defence of the King's and
country's honour.
Before pushing matters to extremes, Admiral Dartige called on the King
(27 Nov.) and tried to intimidate him {156} by telling him that the
Allied armada had Greece at its mercy, and that by simply cutting off the
supplies of corn and coal it could break all resistance. The King agreed
that the Allies possessed all-powerful means of persuasion, but did not
seem as much impressed as was expected. He reminded the Admiral that he
had done everything possible to prove his goodwill by spontaneously
reducing his active army. He could do no more: the people and the army
were so excited over this last demand that to make them accept it was
beyond his power. The measure might be accepted, if the quantity claimed
was lessened: he would take steps in that sense with the French
Government through his brother, Prince George. It was clear that the
King's change of tone arose from the absence of the guarantees which he
had asked and hoped for: not having received those guarantees he
considered himself released from the promises he had given. The Admiral
understood the position perfectly, and in his heart did not blame the
King for rejecting the "draconian pretension" that he should disarm while
not secure that his arms would not be used against himself. But he had
his orders and could only say that he meant to carry them out: on Friday
morning, 1 December, he would impose the will of the Entente Governments.
He still thought that the King would not resist "energetic pressure." [10]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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