That programme France intended to carry through at all costs and by all means. England and Russia, for the sake of the paramount object of the War, acquiesced and co-operated. But the acquiescence was compulsory and the co-operation reluctant. The underlying disaccord between the three Allies reflected itself in the demeanour of their representatives at Athens. M. Guillemin, the French Minister, stood before the Greek Government violently belligerent. Brute force, accentuated rather than concealed by a certain irritating finesse, seemed to be his one idea of diplomacy, and he missed no conceivable opportunity for giving it expression: so much so that after a time the King found it impossible to receive him. Sir Francis Elliot, the British Minister, formed a pleasing contrast to his French colleague: a scrupulous and courteous gentleman, he did not disguise his repugnance to a policy involving at every step a fresh infringement of a neutral nation's rights. As it was, he endeavoured to moderate proceedings which he could neither approve nor prevent. Prince Demidoff, a Russian diplomat of amiable manners, seconded Sir Francis Elliot's counsels of moderation and yielded to M. Guillemin's clamours for coercion.[20] It is important to bear this disaccord in mind in order to understand what went before and what comes hereafter: for, though for the most part latent, it was always present; and if it did not avert, it retarded the climax. [1] _Orations_, p. 155; Skouloudis's _Semeioseis_, p. 36. [2] _White Book_, Nos. 70-4, 79, 81, 84, 86-90. [3] _White Book_, Nos. 92, 93, 96-102. [4] _White Book_, No. 104. [5] _White Book_, Nos. 106, 111, 113. [6] _White Book_, Nos. 110, 112, 116. [7] _White Book_, Nos. 117-20, 134, 135; Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, pp. 25-6. [8] _White Book_, Nos. 95, 105, 126, 130-33, 137. The instructions of 27 April had been issued chiefly in consequence of information that bands of Bulgarian irregulars (_Comitadjis_) were at that moment preparing to cross the frontier. Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, p. 23. [9] The charge was supported by garbled "extracts" from the instructions to the Greek troops (the full texts of which may now be read in the _White Book_), published in Paris. See the _Saturday Review_, 10 Sept., 1921, pp. 321-2, citing the _Petit Parisien_ of Dec., 1916. [10] _White Book_, Nos. 140, 146. [11] _Sarrail_, p. 104. Anyone familiar with the political and psychological atmosphere would have seen that the Greeks were anxious to keep the Bulgars out by inducing the French to forestall them. But Sarrail detected in their advice a subtle contrivance either to find out his plans, or to cast the blame for the loss of Rupel on him! [12] _White Book_, No. 142. [13] _Journal Officiel_, p. 72; Sarrail, pp. 105-8, 112, 355-7; _White Book_, Nos. 142, 145. [14] _Sarrail_, p. 113. [15] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 72-3. [16] Sarrail, pp. 115-24; Du Fournet, pp. 91-3.