Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical OpinionsNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical Opinions
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Physics -- Early works to 1800
But, some may say, _That Spiritual Substances are so_. I answer: That
Spirits must be either Material, or Immaterial: for, it is impossible
for a thing to be between Body and no Body.
Others may say, _There may be a Substance, that is not a Natural
Substance; but, some sort of Substance that is far more pure than the
purest Natural Substance_.
I answer: Were it never so pure, it would be in the List or Circle of
Body: and certainly, the purest Substance, must have the Properties of
Body, as, to be divisible, and capable to be united and compounded; and
being divisible and compoundable, it would have the same Properties
that grosser Parts have: but, if there be any difference, certainly the
purest Substance would be more apt to divide and unite, or compound,
than the grosser sort. But, as to those sorts of Substance, which some
Learned Men have imagined; in my opinion, they are but the same sort of
Substance that the Vulgar call, _Thoughts_, and I name, the _Rational
Parts_; which, questionless, are as truly Body, as the grossest
Parts in Nature: but, most Human Creatures are so troubled with the
Thoughts of Dissolving, and Dis-uniting, that they turn Fancies and
Imaginations, into Spirits, or Spiritual Substances; as if all the
other Parts of their Bodies, should become Rational Parts; that is,
that all their Parts should turn into such Parts as Thoughts, which I
name, the _Rational Parts_. But that Opinion is impossible: for, Nature
cannot alter the nature of any Part; nor can any Part alter its own
Nature; neither can the Rational Parts be divided from the Sensitive
and Inanimate Parts, by reason those Three sorts constitute but one
Body, as being Parts of one Body. But, put the case that the Rational
Parts might divide and subsist without the Sensitive and Inanimate
Parts; yet, as I said, they must of necessity have the Properties and
Nature of a Body, which is, to be divisible, and capable to be united,
and so to be Parts: for, it is impossible for a Body, were it the most
pure, to be indivisible.
CHAP. II. Of an IMMATERIAL.
I Cannot conceive how an Immaterial can be in Nature: for, first, An
Immaterial cannot, in my opinion, be naturally created; nor can I
conceive how an Immaterial can produce particular Immaterial Souls,
Spirits, or the like. Wherefore, an Immaterial, in my opinion, must be
some uncreated Being; which can be no other than GOD alone. Wherefore,
Created Spirits, and Spiritual Souls, are some other thing than an
Immaterial: for surely, if there were any other Immaterial Beings,
besides the Omnipotent God, those would be so near the Divine Essence
of God, as to be petty gods; and numerous petty gods, would, almost,
make the Power of an Infinite God. But, God is Omnipotent, and only God.
CHAP. III. Whether an Immaterial be Perceivable.
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