However, Virchow takes Darwinism by way of an example of which he approves, a point that seems to be established in the province of pure facts. In the Munich speech of 1877 there are polite references to “Herr Haeckel.” “As Herr Haeckel says.” “As Herr Haeckel supposes.” At Stettin we find Herr Haeckel described as “my friend Haeckel,” with whom “I quite agree,” &c. Haeckel himself, by the way, was still convinced—in his essay _On the Generation of Waves in Living Particles_—two years before the schismatic Council of 1877 that Virchow had had a decisive influence on his own Darwinian career. “If I have contributed anything myself in an elementary way to the building-up of the idea of evolution, I owe it for the most part to the cellular-biological views with which Virchow’s teaching penetrated me twenty years ago.” “As Herr Haeckel supposes,” was the cool repayment of this sincere expression of gratitude. However, that is another matter. Let us return to Stettin. We read, where “my friend Haeckel” comes in, that he has shown how scientific research (the pure investigation of facts without the least tincture of philosophy) has gone on to deal with “the great question of the creation of man.” It is merely conceded that there are still certain small outstanding difficulties, as, for instance, at the root of the genealogical tree. According to Darwin it is conceivable that there were four or five primitive forms of life. Haeckel is inclined to restrict them to a single stem-cell. It seems to him (Virchow) that there may have been a number of different beginnings of life. We have here the opening of the controversy as to the monophyletic (from one root only) or polyphyletic (from several roots) development of life, which is still unsettled as far as the commencement of life is concerned, but a very secondary question. It would be well if there had never been any more serious difference between Haeckel and Virchow. The speaker himself thinks it an unimportant matter beside the great question of freedom for scientific inquiry. One thing is as clear to him as it is to Haeckel. The biblical dogma of creation has broken down. It is impossible to take seriously any longer the breathing of the breath of life into a lump of clay, if these Darwinian ideas are sound. Once it is fully proved that man descends from the ape, “no tradition in the world will ever suppress the fact.” Scientific inquiry alone can correct itself. And what it holds to be established must be respected beyond its frontiers as well. What does he mean by “beyond its frontiers”? He means, as he makes it clear here, the same as Haeckel himself. “Church and State,” he says, must “reconcile themselves to the fact that with the advance of science certain changes are bound to take place in the general ideas and beliefs from which we build up our highest conceptions, and that no impediment must be put in the way of these changes; in fact, the far-seeing